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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Drew Michael Williams timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation. On appeal, Mr. Williams argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him
due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a
transcript of the December 10, 2007, jurisdictional review hearing Mr. Williams
requested to be created at the public's expense.

Mr. Williams also argues that the

district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation and failed to sua sponte
reduce the length of his sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In docket number 39540, Mr. Williams was charged, by Information, with
possession of a controlled substance. (39540 R., pp.57-58.) The State also filed an
Information Part II, alleging that Mr. Williams was previously convicted under the
Uniform Controlled Substance Act.

(39540 R., pp.59-60.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and, in
return, the State dismissed the Information Part II.
Tr., p.5, Ls.11-25.)

(39540 R., pp.74-83; 06/19/07

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five

years, with two years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.

(39540 R., pp.84-88.)

Upon

review of Mr. Williams period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Williams on probation. (39540 R., pp.91-96.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation and an
amended report of probation violation alleging that Mr. Williams violated various terms
of his probation. (39540 R., pp.1 02-1 07.) Based on the allegations contained in the
1

foregoing reports, the State, in docket number 39541, filed an Information charging
Mr. Williams with stalking in the first degree. (39541 R., pp.50-51.) At a consolidated
hearing, Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to stalking in the first degree in docket number
39541, which functioned as a violation of his probation in docket number 39540.
(11/15/11 Tr., p.1, LsA-21, p.13, L.3 - p.15, L.22.) The district court revoked probation
and, in docket number 39541, the district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence
of five years, with three years fixed.

(39540 R., pp.120-125; 39541 R., pp.94-98;

09/26/11 Tr., p.152, Ls.12-17.) However, the district court also retained jurisdiction in
both cases.

(39540 R., pp.120-125; 39541 R., pp.94-98; 02/02/11 Tr., p.34, L.25.)

Upon review of Mr. Williams' rider, the district court suspended both sentences and
placed Mr. Williams on probation. (39540 R., pp.130-134; 39541 R., pp.1 03-1 07.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation in both
cases, alleging that Mr. Williams violated various terms of his probation.

(39540

R., pp.136-140; 39541 R., pp.109-111.) After a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the

district court found that Mr. Williams violated the terms of his probation by consuming
alcohol, engaging in non-physical abuse, and violating a no contact order entered
against his children. (09/26/11 Tr., p.134, L.1 - p.136, L.25.) The district court then
revoked probation in both cases and executed the underlying sentences.

(39540

R., pp.148-153; 39541 R., pp.121-126.)

Mr. Williams then filed an I.C.R. 35 motion in each case, both of which were
denied by the district court. 1

(39540 R., pp.156-157; 39541 R., pp.129-132.)

Mr. Williams timely appealed in both cases.

(39540 R., pp.161-163, 170-172; 39541

R., pp.134-136, 147-149.) Mr. Williams also filed a pro se motion for credit for time

1

Mr. Williams is not challenging the denial of his I.C.R. 35 motions on appeal.

2

served, the substance of which was granted at the I.C.R. 35 hearing.

(39540

R., pp.176-178; 39541 R., pp.151-153; 12/12/11 Tr., p.165, L.2-p.157, L.14.)
On appeal, Mr. Williams' appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record
with a transcript of the December 10, 2007, rider review hearing and to suspend the
briefing schedule pending the preparation of that transcript. (Motion to Augment and to
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion
to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State objected to Mr. Williams' request for the transcript.
(Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement
in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter,
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying Mr. Williams' motion to augment.
(Order Denying Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter,
Order Denying Motion to Augment), p.1.)

3

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Williams due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Williams' probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Williams'
sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation?

4

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Williams Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcript

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Williams filed a Motion to Augment, requesting a transcript of the
December 10, 2007, rider review hearing.

That motion was denied by the Supreme

Court. On appeal, Mr. Williams is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his
request for the transcript. Mr. Williams asserts that the requested transcript is relevant
to the issues of whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and
abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte reduce the length of his sentence because
the district court could rely on its memory of the requested hearing when it revoked
probation. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

5

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Williams Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With
The Necessary Transcript

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Williams With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate
Review Of His Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST.
art.I§13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

V.

Wood,

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to

6

"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
7

themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appel/ate
courts or a right to appel/ate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appel/ate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appel/ate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.

8

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. ''This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29,34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
10

(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Williams fails to
provide the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Williams' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits.

If it is state action

alone, which prevents him from access to the requested item, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcript of the requested proceeding was before the district court
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the
transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing decision,
a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing
from which the appeal is filed.

Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained

from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 37374 (Ct. App. 2001); see a/so State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could
rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein
involved");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing

court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he
11

already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings
were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it
already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the decision to
revoke probation.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057,2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
12

this case is not final. Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Williams is challenging
not only the order revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails
an analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale.
Additionally, the requested item is within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcript is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all
proceedings

following

sentencing

when

appropriate sentencing determinations.

determining

whether the

court

made

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,

28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2
Further support for Mr. Williams' position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery

2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and
Mr. Williams is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.

13

in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide a transcript of the original PSI
and a transcript of the original sentencing hearing.

Id.

Even though the original

sentence was not on appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the
Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's
claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was
created before the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the
original sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing. It appears that
the Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Williams failed to request the transcript at issue,
the Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's
decision to execute the original sentence.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial

14

proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Williams' request for the transcript will
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript
supports the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to
the review of Mr. Williams' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Williams should either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption
should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Williams With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72.
In Doug/as v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
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Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcript prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Williams has not obtained
review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
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Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence. . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-B.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Williams on the
probable role the transcript may play in the appeal.
Mr. Williams is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcript.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Williams his constitutional right to
due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal.
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Williams' Probation
Mr. Williams asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation.

When a defendant appeals from an order

revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework:
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The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987).

State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989).
Mr. Williams concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly,
he only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation. "A district court's
decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923
(Ct. App. 2003).

"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate

response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001).
While Mr. Williams' behavior on probation was inappropriate, he did have good
intentions when he violated his probation. For example, one of the reasons he violated
the no contact order with his children was to investigate a sexual relationship between
his sixteen year old daughter and a twenty year old male. (09/26/11 Tr., p.143, L.15 p.144, p.145, L.8.) Mr. Williams also recognizes that his decision to leave a threatening
message on another person's phone was "ignorant and immature."
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(09/26/11

Tr., p.145, L.1 - p.146, L.9.)

However, he left that message because an adult had

threatened his son. (09/26/11 Tr., p.146, L.10 - p.147, L.16.)
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Williams argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked probation.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Further Reduce Mr. Williams'
Sentences, Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mr. Williams asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence, of five
years, with two years fixed, and his concurrent unified sentence of five years, with three
years fixed, are excessive. Due to the district court's power under I.C.R. 35 to reduce
the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation of probation, on
appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being excessive.
State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant contends that

the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577 (1979». Mr. Williams does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Williams must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.
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Id.

The governing criteria, or

objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Williams incorporates the arguments made in
section II, supra, herein by reference thereto.
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that Mr. Williams' sentences are unduly harsh.
suffers from substance addiction.

Specifically, Mr. Williams

Mr. Williams was exposed to his father's alcoholism

as a child. (2007 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.11.) His father
lost various jobs due to his alcoholism, which also caused his parents' divorce. (2007
PSI, p.11.)

While on his first rider, Mr. Williams admitted that he is dependent on

substances and recognized how his disease has harmed his family. (2007 Addendum
to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), pA.) While on his second
rider, Mr. Williams expressed a "sincere" desire to overcome his addictions.

(2011

APSI, p.3.)
Additionally, Mr. Williams' military record is a mitigating factor. Mr. Williams was
in the Marines and received an honorable discharge. (2007 PSI, p.13.) While in the
military he earned the Sea Service Deployment Ribbon, the Rifle expert badge, and the
Good Conduct Metal.

(2007, PSI, p.14.)

After leaving the military, Mr. Williams

continued to achieve by obtaining his GED and a commercial driver's license. (2010
PSI, p.20.)
Additionally,

o

Mr.

Williams'

mental

health

issues

are

mitigating

factors.

Mr. Williams was diagnosed with major depressive disorder. (2007 PSI, p.15.) During
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his 2010 mental health evaluation, Mr. Williams expressed symptoms associated with
bipolar disorder and PTSD. (2010 Mental health evaluation, p.1.)
Finally, Mr. Williams' remorse and acceptance of responsibility are mitigating
factors.

Mr. Williams expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions

which led to the stalking conviction. (02/07/11 Tr., p.29, L.9 - p.31, L.17.) Mr. Williams
also apologized to the victim. (02/97/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.11-12.) At the June 20,2011 rider
review hearing, Mr. Williams renewed his apology to the victim and said he deeply
regrets his actions. (06/20/11 Tr., p.43, Ls.12-17.)
In light of the mitigating factors present in this matter, the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce the length of Mr. Williams' sentences.

CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Williams

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with an instruction to place him
on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court reduce the
length of the fixed portion of his sentence, in docket number 39541, from three to two
years. Alternatively, Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length
of his sentences as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 4th day of September, 2012.

~i(

~ER;;

- SHAWN F.
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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